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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides a survey of the literature on trade theory, from the classical example of 
comparative advantage to the New Trade theories currently used by many advanced countries to 
direct industrial policy and trade. An account is provided of the neo-classical brand of reciprocal 
demand and resource endowment theories, along with their usual empirical verifications and 
logical critiques. A useful supplement is provided in terms of Staffan Linder’s theory of 
“overlapping demand,” which provides an explanation of trade structure in terms of aggregate 
demand. Attention is drawn to new developments in trade theory, with strategic trade providing 
inputs to industrial policy. Issues relating to trade, growth, and development are dealt with 
separately, supplemented by an account of the neo-Marxist versions of trade and 
underdevelopment.  
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CLASSICAL THEORY: THE EARLY BEGINNING OF A THEORY OF FREE TRADE 
 
Tracing back the evolution of what today is recognized as the standard theory of international 
trade, one goes back to the years between 1776 and 1826, which respectively mark the 
publications of Adam Smith’s (1986 [1776]) Wealth of Nations and David Ricardo’s Principles 
of Economics (1951). The two volumes herald the formulation of a theory of free trade, based 
on the unprecedented success of England in the respective fields of industry and trade. For 
Smith, the division of labor, in the nascent large-scale industries of his homeland England, 
provided the base for lowering labor costs, which ensured effective competition across 
countries. Possible dilemmas in terms of the need for monetary adjustments for countries having 
a continuous trade surplus (with absolute advantage in all traded goods) could be shelved aside 
by relying on the automatic adjustment, in terms of the price-specie flow mechanism, the theory 
offered by Smith’s contemporary, David Hume (1971 [1776]), around the same time. 
  It was left to Ricardo to sort out the basic premises of a theory of free trade, which Smith 
had initiated. Industrial capitalism in Ricardo’s England was at a relatively advanced stage as 
compared to what it was in Smith’s time, both with rapid growth of large-scale industries and 
captive markets in overseas colonies. Imports of wage goods (corn) had a special role by 
cheapening wage goods and hence labor cost for industry in Ricardo’s England. Free trade, as 
opposed to the Mercantilist policies of protection, was championed by both Smith and Ricardo 
as a route to achieve production efficiency at a global level. Ricardo’s cost calculations, despite 
his concerns for the introduction of machinery on a large scale, were based on labor hours, 
which were treated as a single homogeneous input with production (in a two commodity world) 
subject to constant costs. It was comparative and not absolute advantage, which was considered 
both necessary, as well as sufficient, to ensure mutually gainful trade across nations, warranting 
complete specialization in the specific commodity with a comparative advantage in terms of 
labor hours used per unit of output. 
 
ROLE OF DEMAND IN TRADE THEORY 
 
For the Benthamite utilitarians, who became prominent by the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, the Ricardian doctrine missed out the role of demand as an explanation of the terms of 
trade in exchange. It was for J.S. Mill to do the balancing act by introducing the notion of   3
“Reciprocal Demand.” A few years later Alfred Marshall further advanced the role of demand in 
terms of the “offer curve” construct, which, according to him, completed the Ricardian trade 
theory by determining the “terms of trade.” However, the supply-side embedded in these 
theories had in the meantime changed drastically from the Ricardian notion of fixed labor time 
inputs to “real costs.” These costs, for Marshall, were measured by the subjective disutility or 
sacrifices of labor at the job. In addition, output was subject to diminishing returns, with 
changing factor proportions rather than with constant factor (labor) coefficients as in Ricardo. 
Units of a “representative bale” of goods offered by the respective nations in the two-country 
model bore the mark of demand as well as supply. Factors as above settled the terms of trade at 
a stable equilibrium, as long as goods exchanged were of a “normal” category, with elastic 
demand and production was not subject to increasing returns. Possibilities of multiple equilibria, 
as arose when the above conditions were not fulfilled, were carefully avoided by Marshall by 
assuming that all costs are irreversible, even when subject to increasing returns (Bharadwaj 
1989). 
 
RESOURCE ENDOWMENT AS A BASIS FOR FREE TRADE DOCTRINES 
 
The balancing act between forces of supply and demand was carried forward by the Austrian 
school with their notion of opportunity cost, defined in terms of the utility of foregone 
consumption. This provided the base for the Heckscher-Ohlin version of free trade doctrine that 
followed. Use of the marginal rates as in this theory turned the Classical theory on its head. 
Simultaneously, a basis was laid for the defense of free trade as Pareto-optimum, rather than on 
grounds of comparative supply costs alone, thus ensuring optimization of production, 
consumption, and exchange (trade) for the two trading nations at equilibrium. This version of 
neo-classical trade theory has continued to have a special appeal to economists championing the 
cause of free trade on the grounds of optimization at a global level, of productive efficiency, 
consumption (and as such welfare), and the automatic utilization of factors of production at full 
capacity. Returns to the two factors of production that included labor and capital were at levels 
that were in proportion to their respective material contribution valued at market prices. Unlike 
in the Ricardian paradigm where the supply cost measured in labor hours was the determining 
factor of trade advantages, consumer preferences (ordinal rankings) for goods was as important 
as the supply factors in determining price competitiveness of goods for the trading nations.    4
  However, the Heckscher-Ohlin (and later Samuelson), in short HOS, version of free 
trade doctrine played down the otherwise overwhelming role of demand on market prices in 
order to bring resource endowments of nations to the center stage as the determining factor for 
mutually gainful trade. With this device, free trade theory moved away from the skill- or 
technology-based interpretations of the Ricardian comparative cost doctrine to an endowment-
based explanation for nations having similar access to technology.  
  It was a Herculean job for the neo-classical economists in setting the stage to arrive at 
the factor-endowment based theory of free trade. Thus consumer preferences (or demand) in 
either country had its role in determining both commodity and factor prices (including those of 
labor) in the pretrade stage, reflecting the disparities in factor endowments. With identical 
consumer preferences between the trading partners, factor endowments determine the price 
competitiveness of the traded goods. The common world price was settled at a level that was 
within the boundaries set by the pretrade prices in the two countries. While factors of production 
were assumed to be immobile (as in the Classical comparative cost theory), equalization of 
commodity prices was supposed to bring about the equalization of factor prices across countries. 
Problems in arriving at uniform prices in absolute terms with different national currencies were 
carefully avoided by ignoring, altogether, the possibility of different currencies across nations. 
Justifications as were implicit in such assumptions probably came from the branding of this kind 
of theory as “pure,” as distinct from a monetary theory of trade!  
  Theorems that follow from the HOS theory of free trade doctrine include (apart from 
factor-price equalization) a corollary, named after Stolper and Samuelson, which relates 
protection and real wages. In terms of above, the scarce factor in trading nations, are to lose 
under free trade under factor price equalization. Thus labor, considered as the scarce factor of 
production in United States, was considered to benefit from protection and not from free trade 
(Stolper and Samuelson 1941). 
Attempts have been made by different theorists to try models of the old trade theories 
(both comparative cost and the HOS models) for multi-commodity, multi-factor, and multi-
country situations. The innovated models, dealing with “Higher Dimensional Issues in Trade 
Theory” (Ethier 1984), did not contribute much in terms of their relevance in terms of the 
observed facts. 
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EMPIRICAL VERIFICATIONS OF ENDOWMENT MODELS 
 
Failure of the HOS model of free trade theory to address the world of realities was responded to 
in the next few decades at different levels. At an empirical level, an observed tendency for 
exports to be more labor intensive than imports in the United States (where capital is relatively 
abundant) led Leontief (1956) posed a paradox that was apparent in terms of the endowment-
based explanation of trade patterns under the HOS theorems. He tried to resolve the paradox 
with his interpretation that units of U.S. labor are equivalent to more than one unit of labor in 
rest of world. 
 
LOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE ENDOWMENT APPROACH AND MODIFICATIONS 
 
At a logical level, the HOS model needed a reinterpretation in order to validate its central 
argument relating to factor price equalization. The qualifications, appended by Minhas in 
particular, further restricted the model to CES production functions, which are subject to 
constant elasticity of substitution between factors of production, thus ruling out factor intensity 
reversals, which disrupt the uniqueness of the factor-price commodity-price frontier with the 
strict ordering of goods in terms of factor-intensities (Minhas 1960). Other conditions that 
remained to be satisfied in terms of the HOS model included the usual specifications of a 2x2x2 
model subject to differing endowment ratios in the two trading countries, different factor 
intensities for the two goods produced and traded, constant returns to scale, and diminishing 
returns to varying proportions of factors applied in production. Eventually it was incomplete 
specialization with trade in both goods that ensured, under the stated assumptions, the 
equalization of factor prices as a consequence of free trade in goods. As in the Ricardian model, 
prices continued to be defined in real terms and not in units of money.  
 
THEORY OF OVERLAPPING DEMAND: NEW ROLE OF DEMAND IN TRADE 
THEORY 
 
Deviating from the supply-side explanations of the pattern of trade in the literature, an alternate 
explanation of the pattern of trade was offered in 1964 in terms of “overlapping demand” by a 
Swedish economist, Staffan Linder (1961). Representative demand in the trading nations for a   6
range of goods that are typically demanded at the respective per capita income, determine, 
according to Linder, the feasibility of trade across nations. To produce and trade, representative 
demand in the respective countries needs to have an overlapping zone in terms of the range of 
goods that are produced and consumed in common. In terms of the above interpretation of trade, 
it is demand and not supply that comes to the center stage as an explanation of trade. Linder’s 
notion of trade overrides the earlier emphasis on supply-based explanations of trade in terms of 
comparative cost or factor endowments. Rich with potentials for explaining intraindustry trade, 
product differentiation (or “sophistication” as Linder puts it), or even South-South trade of 
recent years, the theory, however, was rather neglected in the literature.  
 
NEW TRADE THEORY (NTT) RESTRUCTURES THE FREE TRADE DOCTRINE BY 
DISCARDING LIMITING ASSUMPTIONS OF OLD TRADE THEORY 
 
In the meantime, the rigid framework of trade theory started being questioned from different 
quarters. In a major departure from old trade theories, attempts were made in the new trade 
theory (NTT) literature to introduce the scale economies in production. A major point raised in 
these modifications included the impact of increasing returns to scale on the pattern as well as 
on the mutual benefits from international trade. A related point concerned the size of firms and 
the market structure, both of which were intricately linked to the possible economies from scale, 
thus demanding attention in the literature.  
To appreciate the implications of the scale economies as above, one needs to notice the 
related issue of imperfect markets, which always go with the former. Products, especially under 
monopolistic competition, are likely to be differentiated, generating further deviations from a 
competitive model. In all, the three deviants (consisting of the scale economies, imperfect 
markets, and product differentiation) that differentiate these NTT from the old trade models of 
the HOS variant completely negate the capacity of the HOS model as a predictor of the pattern 
of trade across nations on the basis of pretrade commodity and factor prices. 
  As already mentioned above, increasing returns, if related to economies of scale as are 
internal to the firm, was considered incompatible with competitive equilibrium. This is because 
producers enjoying internal economies of scale are usually in a position to influence the market 
by exercising control over prices as well as the market share. Imperfect competition with 
monopolistic competition, oligopoly, or monopoly could result as a consequence. The   7
possibilities, especially with oligopolistic sharing of the market, have also led to the application 
of strategic trade principles that emerged as an alternative position with strong overtones in 
terms of policy during the coming years. We will deal with those developments of theory at a 
later stage in this paper. 
 
SOME EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO INCORPORATE INCREASING RETURNS 
 
Problems in incorporating increasing returns to scale, which is integral to the expansion of 
industrial firms, had also been raised earlier in the literature on trade theory. Marshall avoided 
the problem of possible multiple equilibria under increasing returns by assuming that costs are 
historical and hence irreversible over time. At one stroke Marshall also avoided the Pigouvian 
proposal for taxes and bounties for the respective increasing and decreasing cost industries. A 
similar issue was also raised by Graham and Knight who dealt with increasing returns and its 
effects on trade (Viner 1937). 
 
ATTEMPTS TO REVALIDATE THE “PREDICTIVE POWER” OF TRADE THEORY 
IN NTT AND RELATED PROBLEMS 
 
Problems faced in the NTT in more recent times in incorporating increasing returns to scale 
have been more complex, especially with its point of departure defined in terms of the neo-
classical HOS formulation. This made it binding on part of some of these theorists to 
rehabilitate the HOS theory, focusing in particular on its “predictive power” for the pattern of 
trade when increasing returns, as well as imperfect competition, are common (Helpman 1981 
and 1984).  
Problems were several for NTT in accommodating increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect competition within the framework of the HOS model. One of these includes the 
breakdown of a perfectly competitive market with scale economies internal to the firm, a 
problem recognized earlier in the literature (Young 1928; Sraffa 1926). The change negates the 
basic assumptions underlying the model and, as such, the major conclusions arrived at in terms 
of its predictive power for trade patterns and its corollaries relating to factor-price equalization,   8
protection and real wages (the Stolper-Samuelson theorem), and effect of changes in proportions 
of factor endowments (Rybczynski theorem).
1  
  Efforts from within the NTT circles to reinstate the predictive power of such theories by 
introducing a set of restrictive assumptions did not help in terms of its generality (Helpman 
1981). Alternatively, use has been made of “…Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (represented by a 
utility function in which utility increases with the varieties consumed, not just the quantity of 
each variety)...” (Bhattacharjea 2004) to conclude that the welfare effect of the variegated 
consumption basket outweighs the losses, if any, from the movement from autarky to free trade. 
These losses may affect the small producers who are unable to reap the economies of scale, 
which permit them to cover fixed costs.  
  As for the scale economies, which are external to the firm and internal to industry, 
production achieves a global span in terms of location. This, in terms of NTT, permits cost 
reduction on a global scale while dislocating production from areas/countries where it is less 
cost-efficient (Krugman 1981; Ethier 1982). Implicit in the argument is a case for free trade that 
relies on the potential gains to all trading nations by achieving increasing returns on a global 
scale (Krugman 1981).  
In the literature a further distinction is drawn between scale economies (external to the 
firm) that are of “national” origin as distinct from the ones that are “international,” the latter 
arising from developments in the global industry. As with other scale economies, both are 
disruptive to the predictive power, as well as the major theorems, of the traditional HOS model. 
However, gains from trade arise with increased output of industries in trading countries that 
enjoy national-level scale economies. Similarly, gains from trade are also made possible to 
industries that enjoy economies arising at an international level. In particular, small economies 
that otherwise cannot access these economies are supposed to gain by opening up. Thus trade 
can be beneficial/loss-making with external economies at the international level for nations with 
possibilities of reaping economies—avoiding diseconomies of scale with integrated markets. 
The above obtains even for countries having resource endowments and pretrade prices that are 
identical. In this case, a small country has more to benefit as markets are opened up and external 
economies of scale are availed of at an international level (Helpman 1984; Eitier 1979). 
  
 
                                                 
1 See Darity and Davis (2005) and Deraniyagala and Fine (2003).   9
INTRAINDUSTRY TRADE WITH PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
 
As with economies of scale, product differentiation distorts the basic properties of the HOS 
trade model. As demand is generated in either country for individual varieties produced by the 
same industry, the process makes space for intrasectoral (industry) trade across nations. Such 
intraindustry trade in both directions is also possible when markets are segmented and firms 
adopt price discrimination/dumping, etc. to maximize revenue by taking advantage of the 
different demand elasticities that prevail for the same good in the two countries.  
 
STRATEGIC TRADE, RECIPROCAL DUMPING, AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN 
ADVANCED NATIONS 
 
Imperfect markets with potentials for reciprocal dumping by nations in each other’s market led 
Brander and Spencer formulate the notion of “strategic trade” (Brander and Spencer 1985; 
Krugman and Obstfeld 1992). The above relates to situations when demand curves are subject to 
elasticities that are different in the two countries Using the famous example of the Airbus and 
Boeing industries, the strategy was one of an aggressive preemption, by creating a market niche 
through subsidized dumping of exports. A parallel possibility also exists with internal 
economies of scale at a national level, when countries that are historically ahead of others in 
producing the good have an advantage over others, with the capacity to produce at a price lower 
than what other countries could offer at the starting point. Similar to the Listian “infant 
industry” case, situations as above justify strategic trade policy with subsidies offered in the 
high-cost country in order to enable the latter reap the scale economies. Alternatively (and also 
paradoxically) the above also lays the basis for aggressive strategic trade on the part of 
industrially advanced nations, a point we deal with in the next paragraph. 
  The strategic trade component of the NTT gained currency, especially in the United 
States, in the public policy during the 1980s. It was generally recognized that the “vagaries of 
history” rather than resources determine what a country produces and exports. Thus the role of 
“history and accident”
2 were both considered crucial in determining the location of an industry 
in the world map (Krugman 1994). Influential people, including Robert Reich of the Kennedy 
                                                 
2 This is viewed by Krugman as the economics of QWERTY or path-dependence as in the age-old typewriter 
keyboard that continues in the latest models of computers!    10
School in the United States, and Lester Thurow, author of Zero-Sum Society, recommended that 
by the early 1980s, government should intervene to shift resources from “sunset” to “sunrise” 
industries, thus generating “high value-added products” (Krugman 1994: 248). Around the same 
time, the Berkeley Roundtable, an influential think-tank at the University of California, pointed 
at the tendencies for deindustrialization of the United States and recommended active state 
intervention, advocating industrial policy along the above line (Krugman 1994: 249). 
 
HAS NTT DEPARTED FROM THE OLD TRADE THEORY? 
 
Notwithstanding its innovative critique of the traditional trade theories, the NTT, as has been 
rightly pointed out, has remained “…fully consonant with ‘traditional theory.’ It explores 
creatively and extensively the exceptions that the ‘traditional theory’ would admit to its standard 
results…” (Darity and Davis 2005: 2). As argued in an exhaustive analysis and critique of NTT, 
“…limitations [that have] remained embedded in the new theory because of its excessive 
fidelity to the old” (Bhattacharjea 2004). Indeed, the free trade doctrines of the traditional (old 
school) variety or the NTT with their purely positive approach to world trade both have failed to 
address the dynamic implications of trade opening in terms of growth and development of the 
trading nations; especially so for the developing countries. It is interesting to note that these 
static theories of optimal resource allocation under free trade, in the standard comparative cost 
version or in the HOS theorems, both failed to reckon the awareness shared by Smith and 
Ricardo on uneven development of nations (Darity and Davis 2005:3). This applies to analysis 
of increasing returns, innovation, and market-size in Smith, and of technical progress, as well as 
the Corn Law debate (the latter as a possible hindrance to industrialization) as in Ricardo. 
Smith, in particular, seems to be aware of the “marked differences” in economic development of 
nations as “…he refers to ‘nations of savages’ coexisting with ‘civilized nations’.” As it has 
been argued, both Smith and Ricardo, despite their basic differences on the respective notions of 
increasing as distinct from diminishing returns to scale, “…provides a framework for directly 
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TRADE, GROWTH, AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
On balance, the neo-classical trade theories, of the HOS variant or even the more realistic 
models introduced as NTT, both failed to address the issue of growth and development which 
include, “viewing change by comparing static equilibrium states, rather than as a process 
occurring in historical irreversible time.” The agenda the NTT theorists had set for themselves 
clearly excluded situations where “…changes can happen in resource endowments, 
technological possibilities, or consumer preferences” (Bhattacharjea 2004; see also Ruttan 1998 
and Stewart 1991). None of these theories (old/new) paid much attention to questions of 
changing income distribution with free/restricted trade.  
An early attempt to capture the effect of trade on growth included Johnson’s “trade-cum 
growth” and Bhagwati’s “immiserizing growth” models, both offered during the 1960s (Johnson 
1956; Bhagwati 1958). Despite the limiting assumptions, Bhagwati was able to pinpoint the 
relevance of terms of trade movements as a factor related to growth rates for trading countries. It 
is, however, rather paradoxical that “immiserising growth” through deteriorating terms of trade 
seemed to prevail in the country growing faster or even growing in isolation in comparison to its 
trade partner! The generalization, as can be pointed out, was contrary to the world of realities. 
  Terms of trade resurfaced in the literature as a powerful tool to demonstrate the 
inequities of trade for developing countries. Dwelling on the observed tendencies for a secular 
decline in the commodity terms, of trade Raul Prebisch (1968) and Hans Singer (1950) both 
advanced the much-celebrated thesis relating to a secular decline in terms of trade experienced 
by the primary producing and exporting countries. Supplementary material, which supported the 
hypothesis, was provided in the Haberlar report on International Trade from GATT (1956)
3 on 
the factors explaining the lack of demand for exportables from the semi-industrialized countries 
in advanced-country markets. The reasons included the falling or low import content of 
production in advanced nations as a consequence of technological changes. As it was argued 
“…industrialization is a significant factor in the long-term tendency for exports of the semi-
industrialized countries to rise even more slowly than those of non-industrial countries” 
(Harberler 1968).  A major factor included the low price and income elasticity of demand for 
those exports from the developing countries in advanced-country markets. Further support to the 
trade and underdevelopment argument was lent by Nurkse in his Wicksell Memorial Lectures 
                                                 
3 See also Haberler (1968)   12
(1959), by Singer and also by Myrdal. Nurkse stressed the role of agricultural protectionism in 
advanced economies, along with lagging demand for imported inputs (both primary and 
intermediate goods) from the less developed as contributory factors to underdevelopment. 
Pointing at foreign investments in the direction of the developing countries, Singer documented 
the damages done to the host countries, not only from the falling export prices and the terms of 
trade for these primary producing countries, but also from the outflow of funds to service and 
repay foreign investment. Singer held that foreign investments indirectly foster a base for 
export-oriented primary production, thus ruling out the prospects of an alternative path of 
development in these countries based on industrialization. For Myrdal (1957) the “backwash 
effects” of investments in open economies often overrule the “spread effects,” if any (Nurkse 
1959; Singer 1950).  
 
NEO-MARXIST APPROACHES TO TRADE 
 
Inequities of trade were also one of the main themes in the Marxist literature dealing with 
similar issues. Using the labor theory of value, Immanuel tried to point at the asymmetry in 
exchange across countries, with productivity gains in the developing countries appropriated by 
the rest of world (Immanuel 1972). 
  Theories of underdevelopment, which rejected the mainstream neo-classical theories of 
optimal trade and growth, offered a picture of trade among nations that was very different. 
These include the classics on imperialism, especially, the underconsumption problem in 
Luxemburg (1968), which could be remedied by having access to precapitalist markets within 
the nation or overseas. Trade had a major role in the process, providing access to markets 
hitherto unexploited. The emphasis on trade continued in the debates that came up in related 
themes on capitalism, with Sweezy highlighting the primacy of “circulation” (or exchange) as 
against “production relations” as held by Dobb (1962).
4  
  Borrowing the hue from Sweezy, Wallerstein (1979) dwelt on commerce as a major tool 
in the “peripheralisation” of new territories and transfer of resources to “core areas.” 
Incidentally, the above generated the much-used core-periphery distinction in the literature. 
“Deindustrialization” via trade and transfers of surpluses from colonies also remain as important 
contributions in the analysis and documentation of the colonial past of developing countries 
                                                 
4 See also Sweezy (1976).    13
(Bagchi 1982; Sen 1992). Trade, along with investment, is used in an even more effective way 
in Frank’s analysis of “development of underdevelopment,” which explains much of neo-
colonial expropriations of surpluses from the developing areas. Theories as above have 
considerably influenced the “Dependencia” (Frank 1967; Amin et al. 1981; Amin 1972; Braun 
1983) school of thought, which had its origin in Latin America. The thesis dwells on the 
inequities of the world trading and financial order, a large part of which derives from trade. 
 
DEFENDING FREE TRADE IN THE AGE OF LIBERALIZATION  
 
The wave for liberalization, which has swept the developing world in the process of 
globalization, has generated some specific tools for policymakers to justify the move for 
deregulation in the global economy. Trade barriers under what was described as the QR or 
import-substituting regime were sought to be identified as “social costs of protection,” measured 
by “effective rate of protection,” (Corden 1957 and 1966) popularly known as ERP. Such costs 
could also be identified as the “domestic resource cost” (DRC), which tested the cost efficiency 
of domestic industries in comparison to international standards. The concept was used to 
identify the potential exportables by developing countries, which moved from an import-
substituting regime to one of export promotion during the 1980s (Bhagwati 1978; Srinivasan 
1978; Heller 1992). In absence of programming exercises to compute “shadow prices” that 
reflect “dynamic comparative advantage” (Chenery 1965), use was made of the CIF prices of 
importables to arrive at the ERP and DRC calculations. These were used extensively by the free 
trade lobby in developing countries as tools to question the controlled trade regimes. 
Limitations, conceptual as well as operational, can easily be detected in the notions of 
trade efficiency subsumed in terms of the aforementioned concepts. These limit the validity of 
the ERP/DRC indices as guidelines for resource allocation in developing countries. We point to 
the following three problems which include, first, the restrictive assumption of fixed input 
coefficients in these calculations to measure the gains in efficiency through factor substitution. 
The assumption reduces to triviality all prescriptive claims of such models on issues relating to 
efficiency gains within the economy. Second, using international (CIF) prices as a surrogate for 
“shadow prices” in calculating these indices often leads to serious anomalies, with negative 
ERP/DRC values, which are meaningless for allocational purposes. Third, possibilities of   14
monopoly power enjoyed by different protected units may generate a ranking of industries by 
ERP/DRC criteria that do not reflect inefficiencies under protection (Sen 1982). 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR OPEN ECONOMIES AND ITS LIMITED 
SUCCESS UNDER NEO-COLONIALISM 
 
Despite their subordinate economic and political status in relation to the advanced industrial 
nations, the developing countries have been able to demand attention, albeit rather 
unsuccessfully in terms of remedial steps, to the on-going process of unequal world economic 
order. These include the voice raised by the Group of 77 developing nations in the 1960s, which 
culminated later as the UNCTAD. At another level, the nonaligned nations tried, over a limited 
period when the movement was active, to demand fair deals on trade and investment. More 
recently, developing countries also had been active, though not very successful, in defending 
their national interest in the multilateral trading institutions against the aggressive unilateralism 
of the powerful industrialized countries. We will deal with this aspect later when we comment 
on the asymmetry and inequity of the current international trading system.  
 
FDI, TECHNOLOGY, AND TRADE 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI), which along with technology flow remains a conditioning 
factor for trade flows and its pattern, was not lost sight of in the trade theory literature that has 
come up since the 1960s. Attention was drawn to what was observed as the “product-life-cycle” 
(PLC) of technology-driven foreign investment and trade flows (Vernon 1970; Posner 1961; 
Hufbauer 1966). Innovations which led to adoption of new technology in the lead advanced 
country was considered to introduce, in terms of this theory, “new” products that were 
produced, consumed, and exported to the rest of world. With the “maturing” of product 
innovation, technology as well as capital was supposed to move to the rest of advanced 
countries and to produce similar goods, which in turn are exported back to the lead, advanced 
nation. Less-developed countries import these goods from the respective producing advanced 
country/countries during the first two stages of production. However, production gradually starts 
in the least-developed country as well as the product is “standardized,” thus completing the life 
cycle of the product. Technology at this stage of the PLC has already traveled, along with   15
capital, initially from most advanced to other advanced nations, and finally to these least-
developed countries who now export the product to advanced nations.  
  With product specifications (new, maturing, standardized) and the initial control over the 
market by advanced countries, the PLC theory of technology-driven trade incorporates both 
product differentiation and market imperfections.  
A similar emphasis was laid on technology-driven trade flows and its pattern in models 
that interpreted the “technological gap” among nations in terms of “demand-lag” on part of 
consumers and “reaction-lag” on part of producers in the home country, as well as the 
“imitation-lag” on part of producers in the foreign country (Posner 1961). 
  While the basic premise of PLC and similar other neo-technology models rest on 
diffusion (or transfer) of technology across nations, the process is unclear in absence of a 
reference to MNC practices relating to parent companies and the subsidiaries. Aspects as above 
have remained an area of research in the branch of economics known as industrial organization 
theory, which again, deviates even more from the world of realities. A relatively more realistic 
approach to the FDI-trade nexus consists of the flying geese paradigm (Ozawa 1995), which 
sought to explain the relocation of production and the shifting export platforms in Asia that had 
taken place since the 1980s. 
  On retrospection, the PLC brand of literature seems to have provided a platform for an 
integrated approach to trade, technology, and FDI while introducing product differentiation as 
well as market imperfection. Compared to the earlier approaches to trade models in “old 
theories,” which were primarily location-specific (comparative cost, resource endowments), 
PLC theory has introduced product-specific (new, mature, standardized) characterizations and 
also organization-specific factors. Incidentally, factors as above (especially the last two) also 
feature in the NTT models. 
 
WHAT REMAINS OF THE THEORIES OF A CONFLICT-FREE HARMONIOUS 
WORLD OF FREE TRADE? 
 
Advances in trade theory and policy have not, however, kept pace with issues, which concern 
the majority of nations in guiding policy, particularly in the developing area. Thus trade policies 
advocated by mainstream neo-classical economists dwell exclusively on the Pareto optimality 
conditions in multiple markets that are achievable under free trade. Literature dealing with   16
second-best suboptimal conditions has treated all deviations from competitive equilibrium as 
“distortions” in terms of the first-best Pareto optima. It is but natural that policy conclusions that 
emerge from the above formulations fail to address the world of realities. Contrary to what is 
claimed in these theories, little has been achieved in terms of a conflict-free, harmonious world 
of free trade policies. Theories as above clearly fail to provide a manual for policymakers that 
avoids the terrain of conflicting interests related to trade that arise within and across nations.  
  As for the advanced nations where these theories are nurtured in official circles even 
today, rising unemployment figures as well as oversupply of domestic goods are often related to 
labor market distortions (trade union militancy and wage rigidity, in-migration, lack of skill), 
cheap foreign goods (produced abroad with cheap labor, outsourcing), or even an overvalued 
foreign currency (e.g, Chinese yuan, at present). Little attention, if any, is paid to demand 
deficiency at home, which remains a major culprit of such malaise in the advanced economies.                       
 
ANOMALOUS USAGES OF TRADE THEORY IN POLICIES ADVANCED BY 
INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS 
 
On the whole, the norms of trade policy that are accepted and pushed by advanced nations seem 
to rely on two distinct strands of theorization. For developing countries the recommendation is 
to liberalize and open up as much as possible, in order to avail of the “benefits” of the free trade 
doctrine of the old variant. For their home economies, the prevalence of unemployment and low 
growth are taken seriously, and the remedy is sought by using strategic trade of the NTT variant. 
Arguments as above permeate the policy moves, not only at level of intergovernmental trade 
deals, but through multilateral trading institutions, such as the WTO, where the stand taken by 
these nations often reign supreme. 
 
SOME INSTANCES IN THE WTO REGIME 
 
It is not difficult to provide instances of the world trading regime, which are rather anomalous 
and discriminatory as far as the developing country trade partners are concerned. A major 
example consists of the unilateralist approach implicit in the upcoming regional trade blocs, 
including NAFTA and the EU. A provision was there in terms of article XIV of the GATT and 
its updated version in the WTO to allow exemptions from Most Favored Nation clause (MFN)   17
for customs unions and free trade areas on the condition that the common external tariff of the 
union members should not be raised further. While attempts have been made to justify the 
burgeoning preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) as a form of “open regionalism,” which 
prepares the stage for complete trade liberalization (Council of Economic Advisors 1995), it is 
not hard to observe regional trade arrangements (say NAFTA, APEC) “…as a process by which 
a hegemonic power (often manages) to satisfy its multiple trade-oriented demands on other 
weaker nations more easily than through multilaterlism” (Bhagwati and Krueger 2001; 
Srinivasan 1998). Pressures as above, with the threat of denying market access to the large 
industrialized countries, have even countered moves on part of the weaker nations to manage 
alternative trade forums like the SAPTA in South Asia or the Mercosur in Latin America. 
  Despite the goals initially set up in the Uruguay rounds of trade talks to bring in 
efficiency gains by eliminating trade barriers across nations, the rich industrialized nations have 
managed to rely on various nontariff barriers. These include the various subsidies on agriculture, 
industrial, and innovative activities in the home countries. Use is also being made of 
antidumping provisions to weed out potential threats from developing country imports to 
manufactures of local origin. Ministerial talks that have followed the Uruguay rounds have 
opened up areas of discord between the members, with developing countries trying to resist the 
pressures to adopt trade practices with an in-built bias to favor the developed countries. Mention 
may here be made of the unfulfilled promises of the Doha Ministerial Round (2001) in regard to 
market access for agriculture, especially in the advanced countries. The clock has rather turned 
backwards with trade liberalizing forces operating in developing countries instead of the 
developed ones, where protectionist subsidies have continued to rule supreme. Expansion of the 
negotiating agenda rather than the consolidation of the prevailing ones was the central issue in 
earlier negotiations with the broadening of the issues at the Singapore Ministerial Conference 
(1996). These sought to cover investment, competition policy, government procurement, trade 
facilitation, and labor and environmental standards. The developed countries, in turn, were 
neither ready nor inclined to incorporate all these demands, mostly from the developed 
countries, in terms of the existing WTO framework. The last meeting of the ministerial group at 
Cancun (2003) similarly has failed to arrive at a consensus on major issues including the Doha 
and Singapore concerns. For example, it was pointed out that the agriculture section is either too 
ambitious or not ambitious enough. They differed over whether to launch negotiations on the 
Singapore issues or whether there is no consensus to do so. They had comments on the   18
nonagricultural market access text, including the description of the tariff-cutting formula and 
whether sectoral deals (zero tariffs for all products within specified sectors) should be 
compulsory for all members. 
  Several of the ministers held that the text on the cotton initiative did not reflect the 
proposal to phase out subsidies and for subsidizing countries to compensate the African 
producers in the interim; a number of African and Caribbean countries in particular said the 
draft does too little on special and differential treatment for developing countries. Thus, as was 
put in the official WTO website, “…It is but ironical that a few countries, both developed and 
developing, expressed concern that the negative sentiments would wipe out what they described 
as possible significant results in areas such as agriculture, which are particularly important for 
developing countries. Two large members warned that each delegation would be responsible for 
what happened that night.”
5 
  Indications of discords between member countries in the face of “aggressive 
unilateralism” on part of the more powerful nations both have surfaced in the course of the long-
drawn WTO negotiations. Mention may be made of the near collapse of the MFA relating to 
textiles,
6 the shrinking coverage of products (with the “graduation” provision of the EU) under 
the GSP, dilution of the Special and Differential Treatment for all developing countries to “best-
endeavor clauses,” etc. 
  The strong-arm tactics of the advanced nations within and outside the WTO has 
continued to prevail with the back up of the never-fulfilled promise of greater market access in 
agriculture, textile, and clothing, as well as the movement of natural persons under services. In 
addition, the IFIs including the IMF, the World Bank, and even the G-10-controlled BIS has 
continued to exercise control and impose regulations in the interest of finance, which has a large 
impact in shaping world trade. It is important for the advanced nations not to lose the “export 
platforms” in cheap labor countries and hence to protect the DFIs as well as other forms of 
finance in these regions. Similarly, countries in the developing area that are still the major 
suppliers of raw materials to the rest of world also are sometimes covered with debt-
                                                 
5 For more, please visit the WTO website at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm 
and see the World Trade and Development Report 2003: Cancun and Beyond, 2003. New Delhi: Research and 
Information System (RIS) Academic Foundations. 
6 Even after the MFA phasing out on January 1, 2005 under WTO, developed countries want to restrict imports 
from countries like China. 
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cancellations that also protect the lending institutions. Much of these may have a price tag of 
further opening of trade by these countries, which will make it easy for the lending nations to 




Concluding, it appears that the evolution of trade theory, from old trade doctrines to the NTT, 
has impacted policy at two levels. The first relates to the continuing support of the free trade 
doctrine to determine policy for developing areas. As is expected, the push comes from the 
advanced nations, both at the intergovernmental level and at multilateral institutions like the 
IMF and the WTO. The second impact of trade theory relates to policies pursued by the 
advanced nations, which relies considerably on the NTT doctrines of strategic trade. The uneven 
power relations between the rich and poor nations of the world permits a continuation of this 
asymmetrical combination of policies, to which trade theory unfortunately has contributed 
much. Much of the preoccupation of the policymakers with the micro-theoretic formulations of 
trade theory, both old and new, are related to a total neglect of the macroeconomic issues 
relating to the national as well as the world economy. One only expects that the new theories, 
which are yet to come up, will address some of these limitations.   20
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